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INTRODUCTION:

CHANGING ECONOMIC REALITIES SHOULD MAKE

CONTRACTUAL LIMITATIONS MORE ENFORCEABLE

A.

The Traditional View

In the past, courts have struck down or severely limited attempts by health
care providers to use written contracts to reduce their liability for negligence,
deeming such agreements to be contrary to public policy.' The basic reason
is that courts have not traditionally viewed the relationship of patient and
health care provider as a contractual one, freely entered by both parties.
Rather, physicians and hospitals have been classified, like innkeepers, utilities,
and common carriers, as entities to which individuals, with no real bargaining
power, must resort out of necessity. Hence, courts have not really analyzed
exculpatory patient/health care provider agreements in terms of mutuality of
bargaining or "arm's-length" negotiation. Instead, courts have simply
rejected them out of hand as contrary to the public interest. The decisions
cite one or more of the following overlapping rationales:
(a) Medical care is a necessity of life over which the superior bargaining power of
the provider should not prevail;2
3
(b) Exculpatory clauses have no place in the practice of the learned profession;
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1. Annot., 6 A.L.R.3D 704-07 (1966) (citing Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d
92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), and three earlier cases).
2. "That the services of the hospital to those members of the public who are in special need of
the particular skill of its staff and facility constitute a practical and crucial necessity is hardly open to
question." Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 101, 383 Pac.2d 441,447, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33, 39 (1963).
3.

Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tenn. 1979) (citing W. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON

CONTRACTs § 1751 (3d ed. 1972), which states that "[some] relationships are such that once entered
upon they involve a status requiring of one party greater responsibility than that required of the
ordinary person, and, therefore, a provision avoiding liability is peculiarly obnoxious") (invalidating
abortion clinic's exculpation clause).
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(c) Private 4 agreements should not reduce a health care provider's statutory or
ethical duties;
5
(d) Health care providers have a nonnegotiable duty of public service;
(e) Health care
providers should not be able to violate prevailing standards of care
6
with impunity;
(f) Patients cannot be expected to choose among health care providers based on
contractual terms affecting the provider's liability for negligence;T
(g) There is no assurance that other available
and comparable health care
8
providers will not impose similar limitations;
(h) The disparity of bargaining power between provider9 and patient is too extreme
to give any normative weight to the results of bargaining;
(i) The financial risk of personal injury should be borne by a negligent party when
that party is in a much superior economic
position and capable of taking measures to
0
prevent or insure against losses.'

From today's perspective, two things are notable about such traditional
legal policy assertions. First, courts were predisposed to reject contractual
redefinition of liability rules because most such attempts were one-sided
efforts by the health care provider to completely exculpate itself from tort
liability. ' The contracts provided no alternative means of assessing liability,
imposed no burden on the provider in the event of negligence, and offered no
other assurance to the patient against the adverse consequences of the
provider's negligence. There were no attempts to substitute contractually

developed

standards

of care

or processes

to achieve

fair, impartial

adjudication of rights and grievances. Where courts have considered a less
one-sided contractual alternative-an agreement by the patient to arbitrate all
claims against the health care provider-courts have been far more
2
receptive. '
Second, the various rationales upon which courts have invalidated health
care providers' exculpatory clauses have rested on abstract "public policy"
4. Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163, (1980), afd, 248 Ga. 391,
282 S.E.2d 903 (1981) (physician's ethical duty not to render substandard care); Leidy v. Deseret
Enters., 252 Pa. Super. 162, 381 A.2d 164 (1977) (licensing law established a duty not to render
physical therapy contrary to a physician's instructions).
5. Smith v. Hospital Auth., 160 Ga. App. 387, 389-90, 287 S.E.2d 99, 100 (1981) (blood
extraction); Meiman v. Rehabilitation Center, 444 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Ky. App. 1969) (rehabilitation
center); Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, 326 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. 1982).
6. Emory University v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 394, 282 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1981).
7. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 358-60, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 784-86
(1976); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1979). See generally Henderson, Contractual
Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947, 987 (1972)

(discussion of patients' expectations when entering into contracts with providers).
8. Belshaw v. Feinstein, 258 Cal. App. 2d 711, 725-27, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788, 798 (1968)
(defendants were only area physicians who performed stereotaxic surgery); Olson v. Molzen, 558
S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1979).
9. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 101, 383 P.2d 441, 447, 32 Cal. Rptr.
33, 39 (1963). But cf Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients and
Providers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173, 185-88.
10. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 100-01, 383 P.2d 441, 446-47, 32 Cal.

Rptr. 33, 38-39 (1963).
11. See cases cited supra notes 2-10. The only case where total exculpation was not attempted is
Tatham v. Hoke, 469 F. Supp. 914 (W.D.N.C. 1979), where an abortion clinic's admission agreement
limited damages to $15,000.
12. See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.3D 375 (1978).
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considerations gleaned from statutory and common law rules, rather than on
actual consideration of the particular provider/patient relationship involved
in the specific proposed alteration. Courts have accepted without question a
traditional view of powerless patients and all-powerful providers.
B.

Changing Circumstances

Public policy, fortunately, is an adaptive and dynamic concept. Recently,
health care financing and delivery have become more concerned with
containment of medical spending and purchaser control over health care.
This reality should lead to a different view by legislatures and courts and allow
enforcement of reasonable contractual revisions to medical malpractice
3
liability and tort recoveries. What limits might be deemed reasonable?'
Well-measured limitations which address traditional public safety concerns
would simultaneously promote this valuable public policy, and provide more
affordable health care and freedom of choice by consumers.
Legitimate judicial concern about unequal bargaining power and
overreaching in health care can be alleviated by showing that consumers are
indeed protected. Courts can judge the validity of alternative liability
provisions in private contracts for health care delivery by weighing two crucial
aspects of the bargain: (1) the degree to which the consumer has freedom of
choice, measured by such factors as the parties' relative size and the
availability of alternatives; and (2) the degree to which the terms are
objectively conscionable, measured by the extent to which the contract allows
redress for the injured party.
Courts should be persuaded to adjudicate the enforceability of private
modifications of previously determined rights according to where they fit in
this context. A relatively conscionable term, such as abrogation of the
collateral source rule, should be enforceable unless the patient was denied all
freedom of choice. A complete exculpation, on the other hand, should be
enforceable only if the consumer had a very high degree of freedom of choice.
An example of such a high degree of freedom of choice is an agreement
for health care between a large employer, such as General Motors or the State
of California, and a health maintenance organization (HMO), that includes
contract limits on malpractice liability. In such circumstances, other insurance
or prepaid health plans are typically offered to the employee, each of which
might feature different bargained-for malpractice limitations (or none).' 4
Clearly, patient interests are represented here: the consumer is not a patient
coerced by pain and utterly dependent on the judgment of the other party.
Rather, it is an entity with economic power to accept or reject the contracts
offered by HMO's and other alternative delivery systems based, inter alia, on
their rates and the extent to which they limit malpractice liability.
13. See Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard of Care, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986,
at 265, 266.
14. Herzlinger & Schwartz, How Companies Tackle Health Care Costs: Part I, HARV. Bus. REV., JulyAug. 1985, at 68.
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Furthermore, the individual has the final choice of which option to accept
personally. At the other extreme of this continuum is the patient transported
to an emergency room by ambulance or paramedics, for whom it can truly be
15
said there is "no bargaining table."'
Major changes now occurring in the delivery of health care in this country
will increase the instances in which there will be a true bargaining table. The
growth of HMO's, preferred provider organizations (PPO's), and other
alternative delivery systems will result in more consumers bargaining in
advance for the type of care they desire. 1 6 Although HMO's are now still held
to the same malpractice standard of care as other providers, their enrollees
are clearly opting for a different type of health care delivery than that
traditionally made available.1 7 Just as importantly, enrollees may make their
choice in advance of their need for such services. Unlike most of the plaintiffs
noted above who signed exculpatory contracts, today's HMO enrollees are
not in the throes of sickness or injury when they arrange for the delivery of
health care services. They are making informed decisions in advance, and are
8
strongly motivated by economic factors.'
The availability of alternatives in health care is another major factor
determining whether the consumer has sufficient bargaining power to make
agreements that are nonadhesive and, hence, enforceable. 19 Where the
employer or a union presents the employee-consumer with a "menu" of
prepaid health plans and other insurance benefits, choice is clearly
guaranteed. In addition to being offered a choice among competing plans,
any one prepaid health plan or health care provider might offer the consumer
a variety of alternative arrangements, such as varying limitations on
malpractice liability, or no limitations on liability. The alternatives that do not
limit the plan or provider's traditional liability might feature higher premiums
or fees. Alternatively, to obtain unlimited negligence liability and remedies,
the consumer might have the option of paying a surcharge, a lump sum
payment reasonably equivalent to the provider's increased costs for assuming
the risks of injury to the patient. Another option might be to purchase "spot"
insurance-insurance which would cover the patient in the event of certain
injuries or losses, whether occasioned by negligence or not. Those who want
extra protection thus would have a practical alternative, but would also have
to pay extra.
Another factor in determining the degree of freedom of choice is the
extent to which the offered limitations and the available alternatives are
15. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 102, 383 P.2d 441, 447, 32 Cal. Rptr.
33, 39 (1963).
16. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 710-11, 552 P.2d 1178, 1185, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 882, 889 (1976); Fine & Sunshine, Malpractice Reform Through Consumer Acceptance and Consumer
Education: Are the New Concepts Marketable?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 213, 218.
17. H. LuFr, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE 40-57
(1981).
18. Schuttinga, Falik & Steinwald, Health Plan Selection in the Federal Employees Health Benefit
Program, 10J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 119, 132-37 (1985).

19.

Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1979).
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disclosed to the patient or enrollees. A limitation provision buried in the fine
print of a contract would probably be unenforceable. 20 In other consumer
contexts, legislation requires explicit wording and disclosure of contractual
waivers, and may also specify the location and print size of provisions altering
consumer rights. 2' Legislation could serve the dual purpose of establishing
the enforceability of certain provisions limiting a health care provider's tort
liability and, at the same time, creating protections for the consumer.
True, conspicuous disclosure of certain limitations for malpractice liability
on the part of the provider could prove harmful from a marketing standpoint.
On the other hand, conspicuous provision for fair and impartial arbitration or
"no-fault" payment for surgery-related injuries, in lieu of lengthy court
proceedings, could prove very attractive. This is as it should be; if informed
buyers want high standards of care and full tort process, they should get
them-at the appropriate price. Those who decide, with full information and
freedom of choice, to opt for a different malpractice regime also deserve to
get what they want. Either way, meaningful disclosure and choice are vital.
For a health plan or provider to offer patients a contract limiting
malpractice liability is mainly an economic decision. For a patient to enter
into such a contract is also mainly an economic decision-at least when the
patient has reasonable options. Where patients can seek the services of
another health.plan or provider and can obtain whatever malpractice rules
and processes are desired (perhaps for higher fees) consumers are protected.
Given the recent change in medical and health insurance markets to promote
consumer control, as a matter of public policy a well-drawn contract limiting a
health care provider's liability in certain ways should be enforceable where as
a matter of fact the consumer could choose freely among reasonable options.
Such contracts would advance laudable social goals, including consumer
sovereignty, the promotion of choice in the provision of health care, efficiency
in insurance and medical markets, and the ability to bargain freely in one's
own economic and personal interest. This article next considers which
specific provisions seem most reasonable and, hence, enforceable.
II
ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGING LIABILITY RULES AND PROCESSES

Replacing the full panoply of courtroom procedures with simpler, faster,
and less expensive arbitration is a major alternative that can already be
negotiated and chosen by providers and consumers in many states, as has
already been noted. The other possibilities for private reform of current
malpractice rules which are presented below have not yet been widely
implemented, and the discussion of them is thus necessarily somewhat
speculative. Judged by the standards already laid out, however, several of
20.
(1976);
21.
SAFETY

Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 358-59, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 784-85
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 483-84 (5th ed. 1984).
See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1979) (medical care providers); CAL. HEALTH &
CODE § 1373(i) (West 1979) (HMO subscriber contracts).
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them appear to be legally defensible and thus worthy of a market test to see
whether consumers and providers find them desirable. Many of these
provisions have been proposed or enacted in statewide legal reforms of tort
law. They may be more desirable as permissible private agreements so that
affected parties may decide for themselves.
A.

Modification of the Collateral Source Rule

In most jurisdictions, evidence may not be introduced at trial of any
amounts paid or payable to the injured patient as benefits from sources not
associated with the defendant. 22 These "collateral sources" include private
insurance or public coverage for past and future medical expenses, sick leave,
23
and workers' compensation, as well as disability or pension compensation.
As a result, the patient can, and often does, obtain a "double" recovery for
certain economic losses. (In some jurisdictions, however, third-party payers
who have made such payments may subrogate their claims against the medical
tortfeasor or may by contract recover their payments from the successful
24
malpractice claimant.)
The collateral source rule supposes that persons should not be
discouraged by malpractice damage rules from obtaining their own insurance
against potential losses and also that tortfeasors should not "profit" (that is,
enjoy reduced liability) after the fact by virtue of their victim's foresight and
prudence in having obtained insurance. 25 These premises may seem plausible
in the context of most torts, which occur between strangers. The rationales
are less compelling if in advance of any injury the injured party agrees with his
health care provider that compensable losses under malpractice will be offset
by any other medical or disability insurance benefits. Such an arrangement
constitutes a mutual acknowledgment that it is not economically sensible to
insure twice (or more) against the same loss and hence to pay two sets of
insurance "carrying charges." One cannot argue that a subsequently injured
party suffers if such an agreement has been made in advance and is thus
deemed enforceable by the courts. Of course, one expects that the provider
may as a result obtain lower malpractice premiums. Hence, one supposes that
the patient should share in the savings in some way, perhaps through lower
fees or insurance premiums or through increased services. Alternatively, the
agreement could stipulate that an injured patient may recover the cost to him
of obtaining other insurance; thus, the patient could incur no uncompensated
loss.
22. Fleming, The CollateralSource Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1485
(1966); Schwartz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41 B.U.L. REV. 348, 349 (1961).
23. See generally, e.g., Annot., 77 A.L.R.3D 415 (1977); Annot., 77 A.L.R.3D 366 (1977); Annot.,
II A.L.R.3D 1115 (1967); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3D 516 (1966).
24. Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 9-10, 465 P.2d 61, 69, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 173, 181 (1970); Fleming, supra note 22, at 1498-1501.
25. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 176-77, 695 P.2d 665, 692, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 395 (Bird, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, U.S. -,
106 S. Ct. 214 (1985); Fleming,
supra note 22, at 1484; Schwartz, supra note 22, at 353-54.
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Some jurisdictions have already enacted legislation changing the
traditional rule. In California, a medical malpractice defendant may introduce
evidence of any amount payable to a plaintiff from any source, asking that any
award be adjusted commensurately; the plaintiff may offer evidence of the
cost of obtaining such other benefits as a compensable loss. 2 6 This provision
has been held constitutional. 2 7 Afortiori, the less extreme proposal that health
care providers may make similar agreements with their patients should be
acceptable public policy. It would in no way abrogate the health care
provider's liability, but only allow offset of such portion of that provider's
liability as is covered by a collateral source. The patient would be fully
compensated. He or she would retain the discretion of obtaining medical
insurance, which may cover a portion of the negligent health care provider's
liability.
It should be noted, however, that making collateral-source contracts
legally enforceable will not necessarily make them practical. Health and
disability insurers may well try to obtain insurance policy provisions that
reduce their benefits to the extent that a third party is legally responsible for
the insured's injury or illness. 28 In that case, courts will have to rule on which
prior contract takes precedence.
B.

Periodic Payments and Other Alternatives to "Lump Sum"
Damage Awards

At common law, a malpractice plaintiff, like other personal injury plaintiffs,
was entitled to compensation for both past and future damages through a
"lump sum" award, payable upon final entry of judgment. 2 9 Legal scholars
have long advocated periodic payments of future damages, as a benefit to
plaintiffs and defendants alike. 30 Both parties benefit if the periodic payment
eliminates uncertainty about the extent of future, continuing losses, including
shortened life expectancy, continuing medical needs, and the like, and
therefore about the funds needed to cover such losses. With periodic
26. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1986); see Brown v. Stewart, 129 Cal. App. 3d 331,
340-42, 181 Cal. Rptr. 112, 119-20 (1982) (medicaid lien not prohibited by CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3333.1).
27. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 164-65, 695 P.2d 665, 684-85, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 387-88 (introducing evidence of malpractice plaintiffs receipt of disability benefits
pursuant to CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1 did not unconstitutionally abrogate collateral source rule),
appeal dismissed, U.S. -,
106 S. Ct. 214 (1985); Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 181-83, 689
P.2d 446, 448-49, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816, 820-21 (1984) (employer's existing statutory right to recover
benefits from malpractice tortfeasor not unconstitutionally abrogated by CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1).
28. For instance, in Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984),
the California Supreme Court held that the legislature did not unconstitutionally abrogate an
employer's statutory right to bring an action to recover a sum equal to the workers' compensation
benefits paid as a result of an employee's injuries, from a third person who is liable for those injuries.
However, an agreement to the same effect between an employee and a health care provider could not
similarly abrogate the employer's independent statutory cause of action, although it might reduce the
rights the employer may have by way of subrogation.
29. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.2, at 1303 (1956).
30. Id. at 1303-04. See generally Henderson, Periodic Payments of Bodily Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A. J.
734 (1980).
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payments, defendants are protected when losses end earlier than expected,
through recovery or death, and plaintiffs are protected against premature or
improvident exhaustion of funds. There are many reasons that a contractual
provision requiring periodic payments or other alternatives to lump sum

awards should be enforceable.
Consider very large malpractice damage awards, those exceeding
$500,000. Such cases are few in number, but disproportionately large in their
economic effect, both directly on the defendant(s) and on the insurer(s)
involved. Liability insurance rates and availability of insurance are especially
affected for those specialties most likely to be involved in claims of such
magnitude such as obstetrics, neurosurgery, and anesthesiology. 3 ' In very
large damage award cases alternatives to lump sum payments would be most
effective in reducing costs, while also maintaining fairness. Future damages,
such as lost earning capacity and anticipated medical needs, are the major
components of the largest personal injury awards. 32 The multimillion dollar
awards almost invariably involve a child or young adult with a life expectancy
of ten years or more and continuing needs for nursing, medical, and
rehabilitative care. Lump sum awards of such magnitude may exceed the
insurance of even a prudent physician, and cause debilitating economic and
professional stress.
The effect of lump sum damage awards on the prevailing party may be
equally inappropriate. They may be too much for some, too little for others.
Certain plaintiffs, or their heirs, may enjoy a windfall. For example, the
award may assume large costs for future medical treatment that is never
rendered due to the plaintiffs early death, unexpected improvement or
nondeterioration, or as a result of medical advances. On the other hand, the
plaintiffs condition may deteriorate more rapidly or he may live longer than
was assumed. As a result, the damage award may run short, even with careful
management, leaving the plaintiff as a public ward.

Finally, improvident

expenditure or investment may dissipate large awards before the injured party
actually incurs the expenses that the award was designed to pay.
A contract between a health care provider or alternative delivery system
and the patient or delivery system subscriber could mitigate such untoward
results by requiring one of several alternatives to the traditional lump sum
damage award.
One model is shown by the California Medical Malpractice Reform Act,
which allows either party to insist upon periodic payments for future damages
that equal or exceed $50,000. The liable party must post sufficient security to
guarantee the future payments. Payments for loss of lifetime earnings do not

terminate at the plaintiffs earlier than expected death, but damages for future
31. See Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at
37, 53.
32. This and other observations in this section of the article are based on the authors' extensive
personal experience and review of such publications as JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY, the ATLA LAw
REPORTER (American Trial Lawyers Association), and the MEDICAL LIABILITY REPORT (Litigation

Research Group).
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medical care and pain and suffering may be modified by court order at that
33
time.
Alternatively, the parties may negotiate for an initial cash payment,
followed by periodic payments (typically monthly payments). These payments
are usually guaranteed by an insurance company. Occasionally, payments are
made through a trust arrangement. There may be provisions for termination
upon certain events or at a certain date, for life insurance or other lump sum
payment at death, and a variety of other arrangements. Such a structured
settlement is not an uncommon feature of after-the-fact settlements in major
personal injury cases.
Vouchers for medical care and payment of lost earnings as they occur are
two additional methods of reducing the guesswork about future needs.
Instead of estimating future medical services for the plaintiff and the cost of
treatment, the liable party may pay for insurance, establish a trust, or
otherwise guarantee payment for that treatment as the need arises. In many
cases, the future costs of medical care, including twenty-four-hour nursing
and rehabilitation, are astronomical and are very susceptible to being too little
or too great. Lost earnings are inherently more speculative still, especially if
the plaintiff is young. Once lost earning capacity is established, however, fair
recompense is readily made by periodic payments.
Properly structured, each of these arrangements can fully protect the
plaintiff against the losses occasioned by professional malpractice, while
avoiding the windfall/shortfall inequity of the traditional lump sum damage
award. Hence, advance contracts calling for such postaward settlements are
proper public policy. Indeed, some legislatures have already decided that
periodic payments can be good public policy.
To withstand judicial scrutiny, the health care provider will probably have
to establish that the planned structure of payments is not an unfair alternative
to the traditional lump sum award and that patients or subscribers can freely
choose or reject it. Moreover, the injured party must be adequately assured
that the future payment obligations will be met. This can be accomplished by
posting adequate security or by providing the backup of a major insurance
program. 34 From an efficiency standpoint, smaller awards may not justify the
cost of administering deferred payments far into the future, but many
insurers, malpractice and otherwise, should be willing to structure awards in
larger cases.

A contractual provision requiring an alternative form of structuring future
damage payments will not entirely avoid litigation over liability or the amount
of those damages. Nor will it obviate the need for the testimony of
economists, actuaries, and other such professionals. Nevertheless, the scope
33. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community
Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359 (1984) (holding section 667.7 constitutional). See generally Elligett, The Periodic
Payment ofJudgments, 46 INs. CouNs. J. 130 (1979) (reviewing state laws authorizing periodic payments
of awards for various torts).
34. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980).
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and nature of the controversy may be greatly narrowed. For example,
expected time of death need not be determined where the structured award is
for the lifetime of the insured.
Controversy with regard to spending on future medical care may be
practically eliminated through insurance. If a medical malpractice defendant
can obtain, at a reasonable cost, insurance coverage for all the future medical
needs of the plaintiff related to the injury, the plaintiff can only argue that the
insurance company lacks adequate assets,3 5 or that another company will
more adequately cover his future needs (that is, its policy contains fewer
potentially applicable limitations and exclusions).
In sum, properly structured alternatives protect plaintiffs while avoiding
windfalls that may not benefit the injured party, yet greatly and unnecessarily
increase the costs to medical professionals.
C.

Dollar Limitations on Noneconomic Losses

Frequently, the most unpredictable, and often the largest, component of a
medical malpractice damage award is payment for noneconomic losses, such
as pain and suffering, disfigurement, physical impairment, and inconvenience.
Although settlements and trial awards seldom itemize separate elements of
damage these awards have grown enormously in recent years. The escalating
trend in noneconomic damage awards has resulted in astronomical increases
in risk to health care providers and their insurers.
Among others, the California legislature has sought to combat this trend
and its impact on health care costs by limiting recovery for noneconomic
losses to a maximum award of $250,000 in personal injury negligence claims
against health care providers.3 6 Other states have also agreed that such a
"cap" serves public policy. The state supreme courts of both California and
Indiana have upheld the constitutionality of such limitations. 37 The U.S.
Supreme Court has refused to review the California decision. 38 Four other
states with similar limitations are Texas, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and
Ohio.

39

In the absence of agreement among state courts, private agreements
between potential plaintiffs and defendants seem especially appropriate.
Statutes have imposed rather arbitrary "caps," such as California's $250,000
per injury limitation for all forms of noneconomic damages regardless of
plaintiffs' age or condition. Private parties could be expected to bargain for
35. This is a primary objection made by personal injury plaintiffs' counsel to structured
settlements.
36. CAL. CIV. COnE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1986).
37. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, U.S. -,
106 S. Ct. 214, 215-16 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting from dismissal of appeal); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404
N.E.2d 585 (1980).
38. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,U.S. -,
106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
39. Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Carson v. Maurer, 120
N.H. 925, 941-43, 424 A.2d 825, 836-38 (1980); Arneson v. Olsen, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D.
1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 166, 355 N.E.2d 903, 906-07 (C.P.
Montgomery Co. 1976).
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more flexible ceilings that are better related to the type of damage, the age,
and other circumstances of the injured person. There could also be provision
for certain payment without regard to fault. Reasonable and flexible
limitations freely bargained for by the parties should be enforceable.
D.

Plaintiff's Duty to Accept Reparative Care as a Precondition of Suit

One problem with the medical malpractice system is that injured claimants
are not economically rewarded for seeking timely reparative care. Indeed, it
may be to the person's advantage to postpone care until after settlement or a
jury verdict in order to emphasize the nature of the injury or to play for
sympathy. A contractual reform could give the health care provider the right
to offer cost-free reparative surgery or other care to an injured patient, before
a suit could be brought. Such a provision could both limit the amount of
damages awardable for future medical treatment and provide the patient with
needed care without resort to legal process.
Some patients might not want to receive further personal service directly
from an allegedly negligent provider if distrust and hostility have resulted
from prior contacts, but the expectation of prompt and free aid in the event of
an untoward incident could even help forestall such a deterioration in
provider/patient relations. Moreover, patients could choose as their
reparative physician someone other than the potential defendant. Offering
the patient a reasonable choice among providers makes the arrangements
conscionable and improves the chances of enforceability.
E.

Elimination of Punitive Damages Awards

Punitive or exemplary damage awards are increasingly common in medical
malpractice actions. The increase raises several problems. Such damages, by
definition, do not necessarily relate in amount to the actual incurred injuries.
Moreover, such awards are not covered by medical malpractice insurance in
almost all jurisdictions. In many states, punitive damages are not limited to
cases of intentional, malicious, or wanton action. They may now also be
awarded for unintentional, grossly negligent, or careless conduct.
Agreements limiting the amount of such recoveries should be enforceable
except where conduct is malicious. Indeed, a recent California Court of
Appeal's opinion implies that an express exclusion of punitive damages from
issues subject to arbitration may be enforceable.4 0

40.
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III
CONCLUSION:
UPDATING COURTS' VIEWS OF MEDICAL CARE AND
LIABILITY CONTRACTS

The traditional hostility of courts to private agreements about medical
liability rests on two views of the world. First, judges feel that health care
consumers cannot bargain about care with providers. Although some patients
cannot realistically bargain about many aspects of care at the time of service,
especially nonelective care, recent experience shows that lay people can
bargain equally with professional providers about many attributes of health
care services. Moreover, advance contracting for health care insurance or a
service plan offers a logical time and method for malpractice negotiations to
occur. With good representation in negotiations by employers and unions,
followed by clear information about options, and ultimate freedom of choice
for each consumer, this objection has lost most if not all of its force.
Second, traditionally, courts have been concerned that any bargain will
inherently disfavor the potential plaintiff. Indeed, the provisions discussed
here involve limitations of traditional tort "rights." The issue, however, is
how much those rights are worth to those affected-the patients who must pay
higher fees and premiums for medical coverage because of a very expensive
dispute resolution system and ever-higher malpractice awards, often
unrelated to the actual economic needs of injured parties. There is a
reasonable probability that well-conceived substitutes for traditional tort rules
and processes would be well received by health care consumers-in exchange
for lower health care costs and, often, speedier and fairer resolution of
disputes. Supreme Court Justices look for an offsetting quid pro quo when a
state changes legal rules applicable to malpractice plaintiffs in order to find
the changes constitutional. 4 ' Consumers will seek a similar quid pro quo
before accepting changes-and reviewing judges should find the resulting
agreements legally acceptable and binding.

U.S.
41. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, dissenting from dismissal of appeal) (appeal should be
the injured party for the legislature's reduction of the
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d

-,
106 S. Ct. 214, 215-16 (1985) (White, J.,
granted because there was no quid pro quo to
medical tortfeasor's liability); see also Tunkl v.
441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).

